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Abstract 30 
Construction industry insolvency studies have failed to stem the industry’s high insolvency 31 
tide because many focus on big civil engineering firms (CEF) when over 90% firms in the 32 
industry are small or micro (S&M). This study thus set out to uncover insolvency criteria of 33 
S&M CEFs and the underlying factors using mixed methods. Using convenience sampling, 34 
 2 
 
storytelling method was used to execute interviews of 16 respondents from insolvent firms. 35 
Narrative and thematic analysis were used to extract 17 criteria under 2 groups. Criteria were 36 
used to formulate questionnaire of which 81 completed copies were received and analysed 37 
using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and relevance index score for reliability and ranking 38 
respectively. The five most relevant criteria are: economic recession, immigration, too many 39 
new firms springing up, collecting receivables and burden of sustainable construction. The 4 40 
underlying factors established through factor analysis are: market forces, competence-based 41 
management, operations efficiency and other management issues and information 42 
management. The factors were in line with Mintzberg’s and Porters’ strategy theories.  43 
Results demonstrate that insolvency factors affecting big and small CEF can be quite different 44 
and sometimes, even opposite. This research will provide a unique resource on the ‘beware’ 45 
factors for potential owners of S&M CEF. The criteria are potential variables for insolvency 46 
prediction models for S&M CEFs. 47 
Key words: Civil engineering firms, construction industry, small and micro firms, 48 
insolvency, mixed method 49 
1.0 Introduction 50 
While research in construction has focused more on green sustainability in terms of reducing 51 
resource consumption and construction waste, the construction industry has been more 52 
troubled with economic sustainability in terms of solvency of firms. For instance, over 1500 53 
civil engineering firms became insolvent at the beginning of 2012 alone (Daily Mail Reporter, 54 
2012). To contextualise this better, though the overall insolvency in the UK in the second 55 
quarter of 2015 was its lowest since 2007, the construction industry still led the liquidated 56 
companies in England and Wales chart at the end of the same period (Wood, 2015), a position 57 
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it has held over many years (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2015). This is so, 58 
despite a lot of research into the reason for failure of civil engineering firms. 59 
So why have the many studies on civil engineering firms’ failure not really helped to stem the 60 
insolvency tide? It is partly because most construction industry insolvency studies have 61 
focused on big civil engineering firms when the majority of the firms that have become 62 
insolvent are small, reflecting not just the highly skewed distribution of firm size in the sector, 63 
but also the strong negative correlation of incidence of failure with size. The skewed 64 
distribution is clear from the industry statistics: the industry boasted over 950,000 small and 65 
medium enterprise (SME) in 2015; the industry represents circa 20% of the UK private sector 66 
SMEs, making it the sector with the highest percentage of SME firms (Department for 67 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2015); over 96% of UK civil engineering firms as of 2001 are 68 
small or micro firms (Jaunzens, 2001); and 86% of employees in the sector work in small 69 
civil engineering firms (Stanworth and Purdy, 2008). It is thus nigh on impossible to stem the 70 
high rate of insolvency in the industry without doing more research on failure of small civil 71 
engineering firms. According to the European Union definition of firm sizes, micro firms are 72 
firms with one to nine employees and with a turnover equal to or less than two million Euros; 73 
small firms are those with 10 to 49 employees and with a turnover equal to or less than 10 74 
million Euros; medium-sized firms are firms with 50 to 249 employees and with a turnover 75 
equal to or less than 50 million Euros; large firms are those with over 250 employees and with 76 
a turnover of more than 50 million Euros. 77 
A major size related problem with research on failure of civil engineering firms is that most 78 
studies that attempt to build insolvency prediction models tend to rely mainly on financial 79 
statements of the sample firms (e.g. Abidali and Harris, 1995; Chen, 2012; Bal et al., 2013; 80 
and more). This method, in more ways than one, does not really help the small or micro firms 81 
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(Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). One way is that the studies normally exclude incomplete 82 
accounting data which is a popular feature of small and micro firms (Balcaen and Ooghe, 83 
2006). Another way is that many small and micro firms outsource financial statement 84 
production with the main aim of meeting the legal requirement of annual production. This 85 
easily breeds misrepresenting statements since they are based solely on the amount of, 86 
intentionally or unintentionally but usually, incomplete information provided to the 87 
accounting firm producing the statement. This method thus has little implication on helping 88 
the solvency situation of small and micro civil engineering firms 89 
Accordingly, the aim of this study is to uncover the main strategic factors that lead to 90 
insolvency of small and micro civil engineering firms. The objectives are: 91 
 To inductively identify criteria that lead to the insolvency of small and micro civil 92 
engineering firms through qualitative methods  93 
 To deductively establish the relevance of each of the identified criteria and establish the 94 
underlying factors through quantitative methods  95 
This study will contribute to knowledge by exposing the key factors that lead to failure of 96 
small and micro civil engineering firms. The difficulty of locating and subsequently getting 97 
access to owners of failed firms is well acknowledged in the research world (Stokes and 98 
Blackburn 2002; Harada 2007) hence the qualitative method in this study, which will be 99 
executed using storytelling, provides a unique resource. The scope of this work is limited to 100 
factors affecting small and micro civil engineering firms only; medium and large firms will 101 
not be considered. The civil engineering firms considered in this study are those classified by 102 
the UK Standard industrial classification of economic activities (SIC) 2007 as 41100 103 
Development of building projects; 41201 Construction of commercial buildings; 42110 104 
Construction of roads and motorways; 42120 Construction of railways and underground 105 
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railways; 41202 Construction of domestic buildings; 42130 Construction of bridges and 106 
tunnels; 42210 Construction of utility projects for fluids; 42220 Construction of utility 107 
projects for electricity and telecommunications; 42910 Construction of water projects; 42990 108 
Construction of other civil engineering projects n.e.c.; 43110 Demolition; and 43120 Site 109 
preparation. It does not involve 43130 Test drilling and boring; 43210 Electrical installations; 110 
43220 Plumbing, heat and air-conditioning installation; 43290 Other construction installation; 111 
43310 Plastering; 43320 Joinery installation etc.  112 
The next section describes the theoretical background to this work: mainly Mintzberg’s five 113 
Ps of strategy and Porter’s five competitive forces. This is followed by the methodology 114 
section which explains the qualitative method executed with storytelling and the quantitative 115 
method executed with the survey strategy. Section four explains the thematic and narrative 116 
methods used to analyse qualitative data, and the reliability, relevance index score and factor 117 
analysis used to analyse quantitative data.  Section five provides discussion on the established 118 
underlying factors. The paper is then rounded up with the conclusion section.    119 
2.0 Theoretical Background 120 
Given the multifaceted nature of insolvency and that no individual criteria can answer what 121 
determines insolvency of a firm, there are numerous contending theories attempting to reveal 122 
what helps to improve solvency (i.e. to avoid insolvency), especial through strategy. Many 123 
theories on what strategy to use to aid solvency have been developed over the years. The 124 
theories of strategy are quite variant and are not necessarily mutually exclusive; most of them 125 
having different emphasis. The diverse and complex nature of strategy was attested to by 126 
Mintzberg et al. (1998). After reviewing ten strategy models, they concluded that “strategy 127 
formation is judgmental designing, intuitive visioning, and emergent learning; it is 128 
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about transformation as well as perpetuation; it must involve individual cognition and social 129 
interaction, cooperation as well as conflict; it has to include analysing before 130 
and programming after as well as negotiating during; and all of this must be in response to 131 
what can be a demanding environment. Just try and leave any of this out and see what 132 
happens” (Mintzberg, 1998, pp 372-373).  The two most important and relevant strategic 133 
theories according to Moore (2011) are Mintzberg’s and Porter’s. 134 
Mintzberg Perspective: The Mintzberg’s perspective is famous as it took a holistic and 135 
integrated approach to various strategy theories to develop what is known as the five Ps (plan, 136 
ploy, pattern, position and perspective). It has been the basis for some strategy research in 137 
construction (e.g. Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000; Dikmen and Birgönül, 2003). A strategy is 138 
more or less in itself regarded as a plan. Planning is the most popular and is virtually the 139 
default approach by managers. It is usually based on information hence having poor 140 
information can lead to poor strategy as plan. Ploy strategy mainly has to do with making a 141 
ploy to outwit competitors while pattern is about the decision a firm takes over time which 142 
then becomes the firm’s way of doing things (Simon, 1957). According to Mintzberg (1998), 143 
it is the actions that a firm takes, and not the decisions, that lead to patterns; this is because 144 
the interconnection between decision making and actions in a firm is usually unclear. 145 
Generally, there is often a great deal of action with little decisions, and sometimes vice versa. 146 
Further, the actions and decisions are sometimes uncorrelated.  According to Andrews (1971), 147 
the essence of strategy is pattern. Strategy as position refers to positioning a firm in such a 148 
way that it stands out from others. This is very much about being unique. In the non-product 149 
based construction industry, uniqueness is usually about method of execution and this is 150 
normally dependent on the resources at the disposal of the firm (Korn and Pine, 2014). 151 
Perspective as strategy refers to the fact that the ways of thinking in a firm will largely 152 
influence the strategy the firm adopts. For example, a firms that encourages caution in 153 
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resource consumption and waste generation is likely to have employees come up with more 154 
sustainable solutions. 155 
Porter’s perspective: The Porter’s perspective is famous for the five competitive forces 156 
model: supplier power, buyer power, competitive rivalry, threat of substitution and threat of 157 
new entry. According to Rumelt et al. (1991, p.8), “the most influential contribution of the 158 
decade from economics was undoubtedly Porter’s competitive strategy (1980)”. It has been 159 
the basis for some strategy research in construction (e.g. Betts and Ofori, 1992, 1993; 160 
Budayan et al., 2013; Tansey et al., 2014). The threat of new entrant remains one of the most 161 
applicable forces to the construction industry as entrance to the industry has no barrier and 162 
sometimes require little investment (Betts and Ofori, 1992). This is unlike some other 163 
industries like the computing and engineering industries in Japan where huge investments by 164 
larger companies is proving to be a barrier to entrance for potential smaller companies. 165 
Supplier power wise, there are usually many suppliers in the construction industry however, 166 
keeping a good relationship with a small set of specific suppliers, thereby buying in high 167 
volumes from them could give a competitive advantage. This is because being a major buyer 168 
allows the firm to drive down prices of the supplier. It also ensures the firm is given priority 169 
when there is materials shortage. The threat of substitution refers to how easy it is for a client 170 
to replace one firm with the other. This threat is usually high in the construction industry as 171 
there are always too many firms competing for one job, hence being unique can give a 172 
competitive advantage here. Competitive rivalry, which is the fifth force, is the same as 173 
Mintzberg’s strategy as position in that it is all about firms vying for a better/unique position 174 
to give them competitive advantage. According to Betts and Ofori (1992), vying for position 175 
is a strong competitive force among small construction firms despite the low exit barrier of 176 
the industry. 177 
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3.0 Methodology 178 
3.1 Qualitative Method 179 
One issue common with investigation of failures is the use of financial statements which most 180 
small firms either do not have, or do not possess accurate ones. In fact, some firms go into 181 
insolvency in their first two years before the UK legally required time to produce their first 182 
statement. Another issue is that when a subjective approach is taken, the subjects are usually 183 
asked for their views when some of them cannot judge best what some key problems were 184 
and have repeatedly failed with subsequently established firms. Those unidentified key 185 
problems are referred to as the deeper truths which are unattainable with direct observation; a 186 
viewpoint rejected by positivism and empiricism but well accepted by structuralism, 187 
hermeneutics and psychoanalysis (Gabriel and Griffiths 2004). On using the subjective 188 
approach to search for the deeper truth, it is usually onerous to detach the more or less 189 
important insolvency criteria by respondents in research. Ordinarily, the owner, manager, 190 
employee etc. of a failed firm is more tilted to blaming other stakeholders although, such 191 
blames are sometimes true. This study will hence elucidate the complex process of failure of 192 
small and micro civil engineering firms by analysing the ‘stories’ of mainly owners, and 193 
sometimes managers and employees of such firms. This is done by listening to their accounts 194 
of the life of the civil engineering firm from establishment (or stage of involvement) to 195 
insolvency. By using the story telling method, the researchers prevent any form of priori 196 
assumptions about the criteria that lead to insolvency but can conduct a narrative analysis of 197 
the stories to identify what events, actions, or occasions contributed to insolvency. 198 
Storytelling can be of unstructured interview as in this study, and/or semi structured in other 199 
cases (Gabriel and Griffiths 2004). 200 
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The owners/employees of insolvent civil engineering firms were contacted in two major 201 
ways. First was to use the FAME (Forecasting Analysis and Modelling Environment) Bureau 202 
Van Dijk UK financial database to identify failed civil engineering firms’ directors, and 203 
subsequently identify existing firms where those directors currently work. Fifty identified 204 
directors were subsequently contacted and a request for an interview was made. Most of the 205 
directors unsurprisingly turned out to be the owner of the firms, a common feature of small 206 
and micro firms. The second was to use the position of one of the authors as a college lecturer 207 
that taught on construction apprentice programmes. The apprentices were persuaded to talk to 208 
colleagues and/or bosses at work in order to identify those that have worked in, managed or 209 
owned a now defunct construction firm. Some apprentices were, by themselves, suitable 210 
respondents as they once owned firms and most agreed to respond positively to the request of 211 
talking to colleagues and/or bosses. This method of sampling is known as convenience 212 
sampling and has been used in a number of construction studies (e.g. Li et al., 2005; Oyedele, 213 
2013). This sampling method became necessary because of the inherent difficulty in finding 214 
stakeholders of insolvent construction firms. A total of 18 respondents agreed to take the 215 
interview. Table 1 presents the demographics of the respondents and the firms. Since 216 
insolvent firms are virtually impossible to trace because of their non-functioning-anymore 217 
contacts (Everett and Watson 1998; Stokes and Blackburn 2002; Harada 2007), the 218 
interviews/stories from this research will supply a unique resource.   219 
Table 1: Demographics of the respondents and the firms 220 
The questions used in the interviews were designed such that they were unrestricting in order 221 
to avoid pre-determined responses, and to evoke stories about how the firm’s failure came 222 
about. Although it was referred to as being in its infancy stage in 2004 (Gabriel and Griffiths, 223 
2004), the storytelling method is now a widely accepted and used method (see for example 224 
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Steyaert and Bouwen 1997; Hill and McGowan 1999; Rae 2000; Marcella and Illingworth, 225 
2012 among others). In fact, Denning (2005) emphasized that research that does not value 226 
storytelling as a way of understanding firm performance cannot give a complete account of 227 
that firm. 228 
Storytelling or narratives are taken to be especially valuable and appropriate when researching 229 
sensitive topics such as insolvency of firms (Marcella and Illingworth, 2012). Insolvency can 230 
be a bad experience for some owners which they do not want to recall or discuss it. Extra 231 
effort was thus made to make the questions as non-judgemental as possible. 232 
More time was spent with respondents that delivered many/longer stories as required when 233 
the stories, as against the story tellers, are the unit of analysis (Gabriel and Griffiths 2004) as 234 
is the case in this study. Incidents that related to insolvency or firm problems were explored 235 
further after the stories by seeking elicit accounts of the incidents through direct or indirect 236 
tactic; this is appropriate for the storytelling method according to Gabriel and Griffiths 237 
(2004). 238 
The stories elicited from the respondents can be categorized as tragic considering the four 239 
categories of stories (comic, epic, tragic and romantic) presented by Gabriel and Griffiths 240 
(2004). This is not too surprising as many of the respondents were owners of insolvent 241 
construction firms and were not happy about the insolvency. Some stories however sounded 242 
epic, or a combination of tragedy and epic, as the respondents tried more to show how they 243 
made mistakes and learned from them and then defiantly started (or are willing to start) 244 
another firm which is now (will be) a success  245 
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3.2 Quantitative Method 246 
The themes that resulted from analysing the qualitative data were used to develop a 247 
preliminary questionnaire to determine how relevant each identified criteria is to determining 248 
solvency/insolvency of small civil engineering firms. A Likert scale of one to five was used 249 
where five represents ‘most relevant’ and one represents ‘least relevant’. This preliminary 250 
questionnaire was used as a pilot study with the aim of evaluating its relevance/correctness, 251 
complexity, length and layout before being sent out to a wider set of target respondents.  252 
The sampling strategies used for the qualitative study were repeated but extended to reach 253 
more potential respondents. After a very onerous search, an extra 250 directors of failed civil 254 
engineering firms working in existing firms were identified from FAME Bureau Van Dijk and 255 
the questionnaires were sent to them. This was done via post and/or email. In the second 256 
strategy the author in the position of a college lecturer successfully contacted some other 257 
lecturers, from five different colleges, teaching on civil engineering apprentice programmes 258 
(year one and two) and the questionnaires were given to all the students to pass on to potential 259 
respondents. This was done mainly by giving the students copies of the questionnaire. The 260 
number given to each student was determined by the student, based on how many potential 261 
respondents the student thinks he has access to. In all, over 500 questionnaires were sent out. 262 
A total of 84 (16.8%) questionnaires were returned after several reminders. Three out of these 263 
84 were incomplete and unusable, leaving only 81 (16.2%) usable questionnaires for the 264 
quantitative analysis. Of the usable questionnaires, circa 88.9% were from former owners of 265 
civil engineering firms while the rest were from former managerial level staff of civil 266 
engineering firms. The questionnaire data was analysed using Statistical Package for Social 267 
Sciences (SPSS) software.  268 
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4.0 Analysis of Data and Results 269 
4.1  Qualitative Data Analysis  270 
There are a number of approaches to analysing qualitative data, each approach stemming from 271 
different traditions. This study used the narrative and thematic qualitative analyses to analyse 272 
the obtained data. The narrative analysis, which is the usually employed technique for story 273 
telling was used first, but in a secondary manner (Saunders et al., 2009). In analysing and 274 
interpreting each respondent’s stories, the transcripts were carefully read and each one was 275 
disaggregated into a number of recognizable insolvency episodes (Shotter, 1993). 276 
In order to satisfy one of the objectives of the study of identifying the criteria affecting failure 277 
of small construction firms, thematic analysis was subsequently performed on all the episodes 278 
(Saunders et al., 2009) using the Nvivo software. Both prior categories and new categories 279 
were used and developed respectively during the thematic analysis. Prior categories were 280 
taken from the general construction firms’ insolvency studies while any issue identified 281 
during reading through the episodes were also used to construct conceptual categories which 282 
characterised major themes. The Nvivo software word frequency search was also used to 283 
create themes. Example of coding from priori and new themes and the respondents’ 284 
statements they are taken from are presented in Table 2. 285 
Table 2: Example of coding from priori and new themes and the respondents’ 286 
statements they are taken from 287 
The transcripts were read repeatedly and discussed between the authors in relation to both 288 
prior and newly constructed categories. Extra effort was made to maintain awareness of the 289 
effect of research process on the stories obtained during the interpretation and analysis of 290 
obtained data. It is acknowledged that many components of the research process such as 291 
 13 
 
respondent’s talkative ability, command of interview/story language (i.e. English language), 292 
level of experience, social class, etc. may have had effect on the eventual output. The findings 293 
are thus taken to be a construction process between the researchers and the respondents, as not 294 
representing a single truth, but instead as some possible stories of many potential stories. The 295 
criteria gotten from the findings are organized into two groups: internal and external related 296 
criteria. These criteria are presented in Table 3. 297 
4.2  Quantitative Data Analysis  298 
4.2.1 Reliability analysis 299 
As recommended by many social scientists (Spector, 1992; George and Mallery, 2003; Field, 300 
2005; Nunnally and Bernstein, 2007 among others), this study used the Cronbach’s alpha 301 
coefficient test to examine the reliability of the questionnaire data. Mathematically, 302 
Cronbach’s alpha is written as 303 
α =             N2 COV          .                  ---------------(equation 1) 304 
       ∑S2criteria + ∑COVcriteria 305 
The goal of the test was to check the consistency in the obtained data in order to establish if 306 
the criteria and their associated Likert scale are really measuring the construct they were 307 
intended to measure (Field, 2005). The construct in this case is the relevance of the identified 308 
criteria to determining failure/survival of small civil engineering firms. Cronbach's alpha 309 
coefficient value ranges from 0 to 1 and as a thumb rule, 0.7 is suggested as the lowest 310 
acceptable score and 0.8 as an indication of good internal consistency, 0.9 and above 311 
represent high consistency (George and Mallery, 2003).  Table 3 presents the Cronbach’s 312 
alpha coefficient test results gotten from SPSS. The reliability test was ran and the overall 313 
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Cronbach’s alpha coefficient gotten was 0.868, depicting good internal consistency of the 314 
data.  315 
Table 3: The final 17 insolvency criteria and associated statistical analysis. 316 
To check if all the criteria are contributing to the internal consistency of the data, the 317 
‘Cronbach's alpha if item deleted’, located in column three of Table 3 is further investigated. 318 
A criterion that is not contributing to the overall reliability of the data will normally have a 319 
higher associated ‘Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted’ value than the data’s overall coefficient 320 
(Field 2005). This higher value depicts that if the criteria with the value is deleted, the overall 321 
reliability of the data will increase (Field 2005). In this context, only IC12 (0.870) has a 322 
‘Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted’ value which is greater than the overall coefficient (0.868). 323 
This implies that this criteria - ‘fluctuation of construction materials cost’- is relatively not a 324 
very good measure of the construct hence it was not considered. 325 
4.2.2 Insolvency Criteria Relevance Index and Ranking 326 
To estimate the respondents’ perception of the relevance of each of the criteria, an insolvency 327 
criteria relevance index score was calculated using the equation below. The equation was 328 
derived from comparable formula deduced by authors of previous construction studies (e.g. 329 
Kometa et al., 1994; Oyedele, 2013). Insolvency criteria relevance index (ICFI) is 330 
               N 331 
ICRI =    ∑ (Rn)    x 100%           ---------------(equation 2) 332 
               n=1         .     333 
                 NG  334 
 335 
where R is the relevance rating given by the (ith) respondent ranging from 1 to 5; i=1, 2, 3, 336 
4.....N; N is the total number of respondents for that particular criteria; and G is the highest 337 
relevance point i.e. 5. The last three columns of Table 3 present the IRFI scores, the in-group 338 
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rankings and the overall rankings of the criteria. Excluding the criteria with unreliable data 339 
(i.e. IC12: fluctuation of construction materials cost), the top five relevant criteria are: IC11 – 340 
‘economic recession’, IC13 – ‘immigration’, IC14 – ‘too many new firms springing up’, IC1 341 
– ‘collecting receivables’ and IC15 – ‘burden of sustainable construction practice’, in that 342 
order. 343 
It is not surprising that economic recession was voted to be the most relevant as there was one 344 
in as recent as between 2007 and 2009; and it would have been a major contributing factor to 345 
the insolvency of some respondents’ firms. The main challenge a recession brings is the 346 
reduced number of projects/contracts available in the market, leading to a much higher 347 
contractor/project ratio. The results are discussed further in the next section.  348 
4.2.3 Factor Analysis 349 
To achieve another objective of this study, there is need to establish the main underlying 350 
factors that form the basis of the identified criteria. This will cause the numerous identified 351 
criteria to be replaced with few, more concise and uncorrelated principal factors. For the 352 
explorative factor analysis using the SPSS software, principal component analysis and 353 
varimax were used as methods of factor extraction and rotation respectively. During the 354 
process, Bartlett tests of sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 355 
adequacy were also conducted to check the appropriateness of the data for factor analysis. 356 
Values of 0.76 (above 0.5) and 0.0001136 (less than 0.05) were gotten respectively, 357 
demonstrating that the data set is suitable for factor analysis (Pallant, 2005). In interpreting 358 
the results, all factors with Eigen value of one and above were retained, while criteria with 359 
factor loading of +0.3 and above or -0.3 and below were taken as part of the offspring of their 360 
principal factor (Child, 2006). The output of the analysis was of four factors which 361 
represented 73.349% of total variance as presented in Table 4. The factors were named 362 
according to the offspring criteria as follows: 363 
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 Market forces 364 
 Competence-based  management 365 
 Operations efficiency and other management issues 366 
 Information management 367 
From the factor analysis result in Table 4, although IC12 was categorized under the market 368 
forces factor, it was not considered as it did not satisfy the reliability test from section 4.2.1.  369 
Under operations efficiency and other management issues and information management 370 
factors, the IC5- outsourcing account management (0.201) and IC9-over reliance on account 371 
statement (0.273) respectively have factor loadings below 0.3 hence cannot be strongly 372 
considered as offspring of their principal factors. They are thus not considered under the 373 
affected factors. 374 
Table 4: Exploratory factor analysis. 375 
5.0 Discussion 376 
This section discusses the identified underlying factors from factor analysis in terms of the 377 
constituting criteria. The interest is mainly in the top ranked criteria, according to the ICRI 378 
score, under each factor.  Note that in Table 4, the criteria are arranged under each factor 379 
according to their position from the ICRI score. Because the market forces factor contains 380 
four of the five overall most relevant criteria in terms of ranking, it is widely discussed with 381 
an attempt to capture most criteria under it. Only the top two criteria are discussed in the other 382 
three factors.  383 
Market forces:  A major problem small civil engineering firms have with market forces is 384 
that they have absolutely no control over them. This forces the strategic conflict theory into 385 
play where firms turn to outwitting other firms in order to survive (Shapiro, 1989). The theory 386 
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assumes common interest between adversaries (civil engineering firms in this case) and that 387 
every party’s best choice of action is completely dependent on what is expected of other 388 
players (Schelling, 1963). Small civil engineering firms hence focus more on threats or 389 
potential threats of losing bids to other similar firms for example. They will want to deter 390 
competitors or outdo them. 391 
Of all the highlighted market forces, ‘economic recession’ is probably the most severe as 392 
identified by respondents and in other studies (e.g. Kangari, 1988; Arditi, et al., 2000; 393 
Kapliński, 2008; Thomas et al., 2011; Sang et al., 2013). Although it does not happen too 394 
frequently its effect, when it does, can be devastating. Virtually everyone in the country is hit 395 
somehow and plans for new build, renovations, expansions etc. are widely cancelled if they 396 
are not absolutely necessary. The result is a higher contractor/projects ratio. Bigger civil 397 
engineering firms that lose out on the few bids available in their class suddenly become 398 
hawkish and encroach on the projects small civil engineering firms would normally take, 399 
putting them in more danger of shutting down. This makes firms focus a lot on their 400 
competitors as a means of survival as in strategic conflict theory. A small firm for example 401 
will do anything to know how much its competitor has put in for a bid and will want to beat it 402 
all cost, even if it is at a minor loss, with the hope of repeat business and starving the 403 
competitor to death. One potential major solution is to continuously seek proper information 404 
(Marcella and Illingworth, 2012) as there are usually hints about such events (economic 405 
recession), then create a strategic plan. With this, owners can proactively take decisive actions 406 
e.g. closing firm down early before any losses in the worst case.   407 
On ‘immigration’, the challenge highlighted by interview respondents was the open EU 408 
border that allows people from other EU countries to work unrestrictedly in the UK. The 409 
major complaint was that some probably unregistered skilled workers were able to take 410 
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especially small renovation and refurbishment jobs for unrealistically low prices.  On the 411 
other hand, cheap construction labour immigrants favour big civil engineering firms as 412 
employing or contracting them helps reduce their cost/wages (Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; 413 
Rolfe et al., 2013). The immigration problem is somewhat similar to that of ‘too many new 414 
firms springing up’ as they both represent threat of new entrants. When there is no barrier to 415 
entry, as is the case in the construction industry, and anyone or any firm can just decide to 416 
start or stop construction works, then the market can easily be over flooded with firms, 417 
leading to tipped balances, fierce competition and insolvencies (BurtonShaw-Gunn, 2009; De 418 
Valence, 2012; Research and Markets, 2015). Using strategy as ploy to distract or deter 419 
competitors, for example reporting unregistered workers who avoid tax might increase 420 
likelihood of survival. 421 
‘Burden of sustainable construction practice’, seem to be a controversial criterion because it 422 
was highlighted according to the analysis here and some other studies (e.g.  Carmichael and 423 
Balatbat, 2009) as being a major insolvency driver while many other studies (Orlitzky et 424 
al., 2003; Dorfleitner and Utz, 2012; Siew et al., 2013) have claimed that sustainability 425 
increases profitability. The claims that green buildings do pay for themselves in the long run 426 
in itself is a testament to them being more expensive initially. The sustainability issue might 427 
even be more challenging with smaller firms when clients seek a more environment friendly 428 
way of execution and want to pay less, as experienced by most respondents that spoke about 429 
this criterion. The issue is because there are many desperate construction firms who are 430 
starved of jobs, the threat of substitution is critically high hence the client can make ridiculous 431 
offers. Also because the jobs on offer can be executed by many firms as most firms do not 432 
offer anything unique, then extreme competitive rivalry sets in and firms put in unrealistic 433 
deals for requests like more expensive sustainable construction.  Further, as firms try to 434 
establish special relationship with clients and ensure repeat business in a market with high 435 
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contractor/client ratio, they go that harmful extra length to please the client, resulting in 436 
considerable buyer (client) power (Betts and Ofori, 1992) which allows clients to drive down 437 
bid prices. 438 
Competence-based management: Quality and quantity of available resources is very 439 
important to firms. Quality is especially important for the small firms as they always have few 440 
resources. The resource quality issue has to do with the organization competency-based 441 
management theory which according to Sanchez (2004), the resource competence is a key 442 
aspect of (organization competences). The theory is defined by Sanchez (2004) as “the ability 443 
to sustain the coordinated deployment of assets in ways that help a firm achieve its goals” (p. 444 
521). The two key insolvency criteria (i.e. retention of quality staff and management/owner 445 
characteristics) identified under this factor in this study are human resource based criteria. 446 
Finding out that quality resource can help avoid insolvency is in line with Barney’s (1991) 447 
study where he noted that the resources of a firm can be the main cause/driver of continued 448 
competitive advantage as the resources empower the firm to apply strategies that boost 449 
effectiveness and efficiency. 450 
 ‘Retention of quality staff’ as a reason for insolvency was linked directly to firm size (Kale 451 
and Arditi, 1999) and immigrants by respondents. Quality staff that are immigrants generally 452 
do not mind to work with small civil engineering firms when they have visa restrictions but 453 
once they get better offers with potential sponsorship from bigger firms, they switch. The 454 
challenge is that most small civil engineering firms position themselves strategically (Strategy 455 
as Position) as low wage payers with little benefit. With bigger firms offering trainings, 456 
mentoring to professional membership, golden hello, access to state of the art equipment and 457 
software among others benefits, small firms need to position themselves in a way that can 458 
offer some kind of present and future benefits beyond just wages if quality staff are to be 459 
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retained. Though positional strategy is usually decided based on clients, it is equally 460 
important to position a firm to keep quality staff if the firm is to gain any competitive 461 
advantage, required to avoid insolvency, in terms of services offered. This is the case of 462 
resource (a quality staff in this case) leading to position (Korn and Pine, 2014) although, the 463 
positional view is always seen in contrast to the resource based view strategy (Barney, 1991).  464 
There are various characteristics of a small civil engineering firm’s management team, chief 465 
executive officer (CEO), president or owner that have adverse effects on its survival. These 466 
include unfounded optimism, taking unworthy risks with large construction projects, 467 
autocracy, a person holding multiple executive positions, etc.  (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; 468 
Abidali and Harris, 1995; Daily and Johnson, 1997). The most damaging of all is autocracy as 469 
it is a common feature of failed construction firms (Hall 1994; Abidali and Harris, 1995) and 470 
was common to some of the respondents as they used the word ‘I’ frequently. From their 471 
stories, most decision were taken just by them without input from other staff members. 472 
Unfounded optimism has also been identified as a major cause of insolvency by Ucbasaran et 473 
al. (2009). The inertia of a construction company’s owner/management leads to not realising 474 
the available opportunities and threats to the business (Gilbert, 2005). When business is slow, 475 
a construction firm specialized in pile foundation installation, for example, should be able to 476 
identify opportunities of excavation projects and use its excavators for executing such 477 
projects. Most management/owner characteristics are a case of strategy as perspective as this 478 
relies heavily on patterns of thinking. A quality, intelligent and experienced 479 
management/owner for example, will be able to consistently think of alternatives when works 480 
in the firm’s area of specialty are unavailable. This then in turn becomes the pattern and 481 
strategy of the firm. 482 
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Operations efficiency and other management issues: The problem of ‘collecting 483 
receivables’ is a big one for small civil engineering firms (Arditi, et al., 2000) and leads the 484 
line in this factor. From the stories of respondents, it appears collecting payment for work 485 
done has been a ‘pain in the neck’ for small civil engineering firms. A potential solution 486 
might be to take the strategy as pattern approach, where the pattern of happenings in a firm is 487 
checked, then what is has led to quick collection of receivables in the past is retained and 488 
ferocious effort is made to dumping elements that have led otherwise. 489 
Buying unnecessary equipment is usually a case where a small civil engineering firm seeks to 490 
improve itself by buying some high level equipment. This leads to increased company 491 
overheads which is normally needed during growth. The problem however sets in when the 492 
equipment (or software, tool etc.) gets rarely used/needed and consequently does not bring 493 
value, yet bring about significant maintenance expenses. This is sometimes as a result of the 494 
cyclical construction market or wrong projections where a firm, based on maybe the last three 495 
projects executed, wrongly deems a particular expensive equipment (or software, tool etc.) 496 
useful as it envisages winning many similar projects (unfounded optimism). Sadly, these 497 
expenses are quite hard to remove, forcing a firm to become slave to its overhead, and 498 
inevitably leading to losses (Schleifer et al. 2014) 499 
Information management: ‘Start-up reason/poor planning’ is the most important under this 500 
factor. Numerous respondents expressed regret on either seeking information from the wrong 501 
sources, or not seeking enough information, before starting the firm. Their poor strategy as 502 
plan clearly contributed to their insolvency as also found in other studies (e.g. Hall, 1994; 503 
Marcella and Illingworth, 2012). It appeared the unfortunate assumption that as a consumer, it 504 
should be easy to make the consumed product had set in in some cases as indicated by one 505 
respondent. 506 
 22 
 
The case of ‘isolation/networking’ is that of not having the right information about where to 507 
go when there is a problem. Networking from early stage is very vital to the survival to any 508 
small firm as already established by Deakins and Freel (1998). The isolation complaint is a 509 
testament to the poor information gathering culture of small civil engineering firms as there 510 
are many bodies/networks that any small firm or small civil engineering firms can join (e.g. 511 
Federation of Small Businesses or Construction Excellence respectively). Isolation would not 512 
bode well for competitive rivalry as it becomes hard to compete against other small civil 513 
engineering firms that boast proper networking and enjoy various benefits. A firm with 514 
Federation of Small Businesses for instance, might get the body’s technical, financial, 515 
resource, mental and legal support in a legal conflict arising from a contract thereby boosting 516 
his chances of winning.  517 
6.0  Conclusion 518 
This study focuses on uncovering the main factors that lead to insolvency of small civil 519 
engineering firms using mixed method. Story telling method was used to obtain qualitative 520 
data which was analysed with narrative and thematic analysis. The resulting themes were used 521 
to create insolvency criteria which were in turn used to form a questionnaire. The 522 
questionnaire responses were analysed using reliability analysis, relevance index score and 523 
factor analysis. The results showed that the five most relevant criteria include economic 524 
recession, immigration, too many new firms springing up, collecting receivables and burden 525 
of sustainable construction practice in that order. The four underlying factors established 526 
through factor analysis are: market forces, competence-based management, operations 527 
efficiency and other management issues and information management.   528 
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Though predictable, it can be deduced from the results that factors affecting big and small 529 
civil engineering firms can be quite different and sometimes, even opposite. More studies 530 
should hence focus on small civil engineering firms if the insolvency tide in the construction 531 
industry is to be stemmed since over 96% of UK civil engineering firms are small or micro in 532 
size. Further, the top three most relevant criteria from the relevance index score are of the 533 
market forces factor, showing that the main reasons for insolvency are not usually directly 534 
influence-able by the affected small civil engineering firms. The key solution is therefore to 535 
be prepared for the worst by always sourcing the right information and using strategy as plan 536 
among other strategies. It can be concluded from the discussion section that the 537 
implementation of most of the elements of Mintzberg’s five Ps of strategy and/or Porter’s five 538 
competitive forces can help to avert insolvency of small civil engineering firms.  539 
The practical implication of this research is mainly in the unique resource it provides for 540 
potential and current owners of small and micro civil engineering firms. They can definitely 541 
get some knowledge on what strategies to implement to avoid insolvency from this study. The 542 
contribution to knowledge here is the presentation of criteria that can serve as variables for 543 
developing insolvency prediction models for small civil engineering firms (IPMCEF). Also, 544 
the criteria/factors presented in this study can be used to develop a theory to be tested in 545 
future studies. The limitation of this work is that data was not collected from 546 
owners/managers of existing firms. Care should thus be taken in implementing the findings 547 
because there is no other evidence that relates them to insolvency of small CEFs apart from 548 
the fact that they are reported and ranked by owners/managers of failed S&M CEFs.  Future 549 
studies should carry out more inductive works, and endeavour to include owners/managers of 550 
existing S&M CEFs in their study, to establish many more criteria; this will make it possible 551 
to correlate the criteria (variables) to insolvency, develop regression models, and develop 552 
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IPMCEF.  Future studies should also make effort to establish factors differentiating good and 553 
bad CEFs in good and bad economic environment.   554 
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Table 1: Demographics of the respondents and the firms 689 
Respondent Type Number of 
respondents 
No. of years that 
insolvent firm(s) 
operated for 
No of owner 
respondents that 
currently own 
another firm 
Owner 4 1-2 4 
2 3-4 1 
5 5-6 5 
1 7-10 1 
4 10-15 2 
Managerial level 
employee 
1 5-6 (5)* - 
1 7-10 (9)* - 
Total 18   
*Figures in parenthesis represent the number of years the managerial level employee spent 690 
with the firm 691 
  692 
 30 
 
Table 2: Example of coding from priori and new themes and the respondents’ statements they 693 
are taken from 694 
Prior New Statements 
New entrants 
threats (Porters 
theory) 
 ‘The works dried out because people now prefer to give the 
jobs to some European immigrants that will do a shoddy job 
for a token’ 
 Collection of 
receivables 
 
Construction is very interesting. You bring your stuff and 
workers in, get the job done and get paid. Easy money… But 
I stopped because people don’t pay up. You make several 
fruitless efforts that even cost you money.  
Conflict 
management 
capability 
Legal cost But I stopped because people don’t pay up… And they take 
you to court if you dismantle the job despite you will incur 
losses on that. 
 Over reliance 
on accounting 
books to make 
decision 
We made took our time and always consulted our books 
before making decisions. In fact, we ensured almost no 
financial decision was taken without checking our 
account books 
Sustainability 
issue 
 Many people don’t know what they want. They want you to 
use only environmental friendly stuff for them yet they 
also want the cheapest price. They want to get what they 
don’t want to pay for 
Strategy as 
plan 
(Mintzberg’s 5 
Ps), Economic 
recession 
 I understand property investment and always buy houses 
and lands and sell them later. Brother, this brings more 
money to do the building [i.e. construction]. The stupid 
problem with economy [recession] caused all my property 
to go down [i.e. devalue]. Brother, why is America problem 
our problem (hisses). 
 695 
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Table 3: The final 17 insolvency criteria and associated statistical analysis. 697 
 Insolvency Criteria Reliability 
Analysis
a 
Insolvency Criteria Relevance 
Index  (ICRI) and Ranking 
  Cronbach Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
ICRI In-group 
Ranking 
Overall 
ranking 
 Internal issues related criteria     
IC1 Collecting receivables  0.839 81.1 1 5 
IC2 Retention of quality staff  0.823 77.0 2 7 
IC3 Management/Owner Characteristics 0.808 74.0 3 8 
IC4 Bidding problems  0.863 67.6 4 9 
IC5 Outsourcing account management 0.852 67.1 5 10 
IC6 Start-up reason/Poor planning  0.846 52.9 6 11 
IC7 Conflict management struggles 0.787 52.6 7 12 
IC8 Isolation/networking  0.804 50.3 8 13 
IC9 Over reliance on account statement 0.860 48.0 9 14 
IC10 Buying unnecessary equipment  0.686 44.6 10 15 
 External issues related criteria     
IC11 Economic recession 0.836 90.1 1 1 
IC12 Fluctuation of construction materials cost 0.870 89.7 2 2 
IC13 Immigration 0.833 88.5 3 3 
IC14 Too many new firms springing up 0.811 81.6 4 4 
IC15 Burden of sustainable construction practice 0.786 80.0 5 6 
IC16 Skill of workforce 0.778 44.4 6 16 
IC17 Low attractiveness to quality staff 0.772 43.0 7 17 
a
 Overall Cronbach's alpha = 0.868 698 
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Table 4: Exploratory factor analysis. 700 
  Eigen Value Percentage of 
variance 
Factor 
loadings 
 Market forces 5.125 30.149  
IC11 Economic recession   0.909 
IC12 Fluctuation of construction materials cost   0.816 
IC13 Immigration   0.806 
IC14 Too many new firms springing up   0.618 
IC15 Burden of sustainable construction practice   0.436 
 Competence-based  management 3.465 20.385  
IC2 Retention of quality staff   0.869 
IC3 Management/Owner Characteristics   0.864 
IC7 Conflict management struggles   0.852 
IC16 Skill of workforce   0.662 
IC17 Low attractiveness to quality staff   0.479 
 Operations efficiency and other 
management issues 
2.506 14.742  
IC1 Collecting receivables    0.889 
IC10 Buying unnecessary equipment    0.848 
IC4 Bidding problems    0.696 
IC5 Outsourcing account management   0.201 
 Information management 1.372 8.073  
IC6 Start-up reason/Poor planning    0.653 
IC8 Isolation/networking    0.457 
IC9 Over reliance on account statement   0.273 
 Total  73.349  
Note: Criteria in italics are not considered as explained in this section 701 
 702 
